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KENTuCKy LAW JOURNALV.
MEASURING DAMAGES FOR TORT HARMS TO REALTY
For many centuries mans interest in having land free from
interference with his exclusive possession and use has been recognized.
The rights protected involve not only the surface but the improve-
ments, crops, minerals, air space above the land, and subterranean
areas.
The tort rule generally stated is that damages will be that
amount of compensation which, as nearly as possible, restores the
injured party to his original position.1 The purposes of damages
listed by the Restatement of Torts are: "(a) to give compensation,
indemnity or restitution for harms; (b) to settle disputes as to rights;
[and] (c) to punish wrongdoers."2 Nominal damages are proper
where the injury to realty is trivial or where damages have not been
established with certaint, 3 Punitive damages are recoverable in addi-
tion to nominal or compensatory damages where conduct is out-
rageous or unreasonable.
4
While just compensation is the broad purpose of damages, the
method of measuring such compensation varies among jurisdictions.
Factors considered by the courts when choosing a particular measure
of damages are the type of injury, the specific land or appurtenance
involved and the degree of permanency of the injury Questions to be
considered are: was the injury permanent or temporary; will the
injury recur periodically, was the injury innocently or willfully caused;
can the injury be repaired at a reasonable cost? In general the rule
for the measure of permanent injury to realty is the diminution in
market value,;, often stated as the difference in the market value
before and after the injury For temporary injury the general rule
is the diminution in the rental value, if rented, or the diminution in the
use value if occupied bv the ownver. For repairable injuries, the cost
of restoration may be applied if it is reasonable in relation to the
diminished value of the property
TRESPASS AND NUISANCE
lanv of the harms to realty fall within the tort theories of trespass
and nuisance Historically the common law actions of trespass and
case were distinguished upon directness and indirectness of the injury
I Hughett v. Caldwell County, 313 Ky 85, 230 S.W.2d 92 (1950).
2 Restatement, "rorts §901(a -(c) (1939).
a Id. §907.
4 Id. §908.
•III Sedgwick, Damages §§932, 947 (9th ed. 1920).
"Prosser, Forts §72 (2d ed. 1955).
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e.g., boulders rolled upon another s land constituted trespass; boulders
rolled into a stream which caused water to flood another s land was a
type of wrong within the scope of the action of case. Trespass and
nuisance have succeeded the old common law actions with trespass
involving rights in the peaceful and exclusive possession of realty and
nuisance relating to interests in the use and enjoyment of land.7
Although there is a tendency for actions in the nature of trespass
and nuisance to overlap, one practical difference relates to the statute
of limitations. The statute begins to run for a trespass at the time of
the invasion while the period of limitations may not begin to run for
a nuisance invasion until substantial harm has resulted.8 This problem
was illustrated in two recent Oregon cases9 where airborne matter
from the defendant's aluminum plant had sifted intermittently for
eight years upon the land of two plaintiffs. The statute of limitations
was six years for trespass and two years for nuisance. The plaintiffs
successfully sought to recover under the theory of trespass because
of the longer statute of limitations. Damages were recovered for the
loss of the use of the land in addition to the deterioration of the land.
A completed trespass or a permanent nuisance justifies full recovery
for past as well as future injury to the property 1o Damages are
generally measured by the diminution in market value of the property
An 1880 Iowa case" allowed this recovery where the defendant rail-
road diverted a stream which had silted a fill to support its track. The
Iowa court held the diversion of the stream to be a permanent injury
for which past, present and future damages were recoverable. The
Restatement of Torts provides that damages should include compensa-
tion for previous injuries, the diminished value of land due to the
continuance of the invasion and the reasonable cost to the plaintiff
of avoiding future invasions.' 2
Recovery of damages for temporary injuries caused by continuing
trespasses or continuing nuisances may be limited to compensation
for harms inflicted before the commencement of the action.13 The
injured party may not desire future damages because further recovery
is barred, in effect giving the tortfeasor an easement. For continuing
trespass, the Restatement of Torts permits the possessor to elect
either a succession of actions or a single action treating the con-
7 1 Harper and James, Torts §1.1 (1956).8 Note, 1961 Wash. U.L.Q. 62, 72.
0 Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F Supp. 178 (D.Ore.
1959); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Ore. 1959).
10 1 Sedgwick, Damages §§92. 95 (9th ed. 1920).
11 Stodghill v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 53 Iowa 341, 5 N.W 495 (1880).
1", Restatement, Torts §930 (1939).
131 Sedgwick, Damages §91, 92 (9th ed. 1920).
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tinuance of the invasion as an aggravation of the original trespass.14
The depreciated rental value or the diminished use value are the
measures of damages used for the continuing trespass' 5 or nmusance.' 6
A Kentucky case presents an illustrative factual situation: the de-
fendant cut timber and erected a building to house dynamite on the
plaintiff's property '7 The court rejected defense counsel's argument
that this was a permanent nuisance and indicated that recovery
should be based on the theory of a temporary injury, measuring the
damages by the diminished rental or use value for a continuing
trespass. Recovery on the theory of a permanent nuisance would
effectively have granted the defendant an easement in the plaitiffs
property The Kentucky Court of Appeals also has recognized the
general rule of damages for permanent injuries in a case where soot
and smoke from a defendant's plant sifted upon the plaintiff's property,
causing injury to plants and buildings.is The proper measure of
damages was held to be the difference between the market value of
the land before and after the soot and smoke had settled rather than
the diminished value before and after the installation of the plant. 9
IOPROVEMENTS
Buildings, fences and other appurtenances of the land are often
considered a part of the realty because of their attachment to the land.
Proper considerations in measuring injuries to improvements include
the degree of destruction and the cost of restoration in relation to the
value of the injured land. If the invasion or interference is complete,
the measure may be the diminished land value. For partial or tempo-
rary injury the landowner may recover damages based on restoration
costs, diminished use value or both.20
The Kentucky rule was enunciated in a 1906 case, where
fire, caused by smouldering cinders negligently hurled from the
defendant's locomotive, destroyed three houses: 2'
Market value is not always the measure of damage to property.
Compensation is the bottom principle of the law of damages. To
restore the party injured, as near as may be, to his former position
14 Restatement, Torts §161, comment b (1934).
15 Zella Mining Co. v. Collins, 203 Ky. 178, 261 S.W 1090 (1924).
f6 Ryder v. Town of Lexington, 303 Mass. 281, 21 N.E.2d 382 (1939).
17 Zella Mining Co. v. Collins, 203 Kv 178, 261 S.W 1090 (1924).
is Searcv v. Kentucky Util. Co., 267 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1954).
19 For a further statement of the Kentucky rules, see Kentucky:-West Virgima
Gas Co. v. Lafferty, 174 F.2d 848 (6thCir. 1949); Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v.
Bowling. 264 Kv 470, 95 S.W.2d 1 (1936).
20 McCormick, Damages §126 (1935).
21 Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P Ry. v. Falconer, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 152, 97 S.W 727
(1906).
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is the purpose of allowing the money equivalent of ]us property
which has been taken, injured, or destroyed. If the thing taken or
destroyed can be replaced in the market, then obviously that sum of
money which will buy another like it will repair the injury. So, if
property is injured, but not destroyed, ordinarily the measure of
damages, where the property can be repaired so as to be as it was
before, is that sum that will restore the former condition. If the
injury is such that it cannot be repaired by bestowing something
upon, or adding to, the injured property, then the measure of
damages would be the value of the property just before its injury
and its market value afterward.
22
If a building or improvement is restorable, should the injured
party be made whole regardless of cost? The Kentucky Court of
Appeals has stated:
Of course the injured party may not make a profit out of the injury
and is not entitled to have hIs property restored to its former condi-
tion if this is impracticable or cannot be done at a reasonable cost.
On the other hand, he is entitledto the improvements he has made
and to enjoy them according to his own wishes, even though they
may be regarded as fanciful and aesthetic rather than practical. A
wrongdoer cannot destroy property and substitute another article
of hs own choosing in lieu thereof and require the owner to accept
it, but upon such destruction should be required to replace the
damaged article in the condition it was before the injury, if tlus can
be done at reasonable cost and is practicable. (Emphasis added.)
23
The defendant in that case had removed the plaintiff's stone fence
and had substituted a wire fence. The court held that the instructions
measuring damages on the relative merits of a stone fence and wire
fence as an enclosure were erroneous. The proper consideration for
the jury was the present cost of constructing a stone fence less de-
preciation which the old fence had suffered by reason of age and use.
However, recoveries for a building damaged beyond repair by a street-
car 24 and a barn destroyed by fire caused by a locomotives cinders
25
were measured by the difference in value before and after the injury.
C(ToPs
Frequently, litigation involves destruction of or injury to growing
crops. Because immature crops have no ascertainable market value,
the measure of damages generally applied is the rental value of the
land.2  However, if the crop has grown to a point where a reasonable
22 Id. at 154, 97 S.W at 728.
23 Reed v. Mercer County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 646, 650, 295 S.W 995, 996
(1927).
24 Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Ban, 161 Ky. 44, 170 S.W 499
(1914).
-5 Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Nuckols, 212 Ky. 564, 279 S.W 964 (1926).20 E.g., Faires v. Dupree, 210 Ark. 797, 197 S.W.2d 735 (1946).
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production can be estimated, then the measure of damages is the
crop s market value.
2 7
The measure of damages for destruction of growing crops differs
from injury to crops. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that an
instruction for recovery based on the expected yield multiplied by the
market price of corn was erroneous and stated the proper measure to
be "the value of crops at the time of the loss, which is estimated by
determining the market value at the tme of maturity and subtracting
therefrom the cost of tilling, harvesting, and marketing."28
When the injury is partial destruction, the measure may be the
diminished value of the crop as it stands after the injury 29 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals has approved this measure where a land-
lord's representatives partiallv destroyed a tenant's crops and pre-
vented him from harvesting the crops. 30 For injury without destruc-
tion, the proper measure was held to be the difference between the
value of the crop before and after the injury 31
Perennials, such as alfalfa and sod crops, may sustain injury beyond
one harvest year. Recovery may be based on either the diminution
of land value, similar to other permanent injury relief, or the cost of
reseeding and re-establishing the crop destroyed with compensation
for temporary loss of the use of the land.32 The proper recovery in
Kentucky for destruction of a pasture crop was held to be the cost of
reseeding plus rental value until the pasture was restored.33 The
Kentucky measure is proper where a valuable or productive crop is
involved. However, where a valuable or productive crop is not in-
volved, such as in the situation of weed cover, the better measure
would be the diminution of land value.
TRIMS
In general two measures ma' be used to ascertain the damages for
harms to trees and timber. These are: (1) the diminished value of
the land, or (2) the loss of the value of the trees considered separately
from the land..34
Although the general rule for measuring injury to shade and fruit
trees has been the diminished land value, a recent opinion approved
an instruction that the restoration cost could be considered by the
-2111 Sedgwick, Damages § 937 (9th ed. 1920).
2SComnionwealth v. Masden, 295 Ky 861, 867, 175 S.W.2d 1004, 1008
(1943).
29 McCormick, Damages §126 (1935).
310 Longs Exrs v. Bischoff, 277 Kv. 842. 127 S.W.2d 851 (1939).
'1 Ibid., cf., Miller v. Sears, 255 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1952).
:12 11 Sedgwick, Damages §937a (9th ed. 1920).
"- Louisville & N. R.R. v. Jones, -22 K. 531 1 W.2d 972 (1928).
34 III Scdgwwk, Damages §933 (9th e. 1920). S
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jury even though it might exceed the actual value of the lots where
the trees had been destroyed.35 The defendant admitted liability for
destruction of the shade trees but contended the proper measure
should be the diminished land value. The court held that it was
proper to admit a nurseryman s opinion on the replacement cost if
the trees could be replaced. However, the trees could not be replaced.
This witness then testified that the best way to restore the property
would be to reseed and replant at an estimated cost exceeding the
value of the lots. Although the verdict was not as high as the witness s
estimate, permitting damages slightly exceeding the land value com-
pensated the plaintiff without unduly penalizing the defendant, whose
conduct approached wantonness. In order to reflect more accurately
the division of damages in cases involving wanton conduct, punitive
damages should be determined separately rather than allowing com-
pensatory damages to exceed the diminished value of the land.
Where trees may be separated from the land, recovery may be
granted for the value of the trees apart from the land. In a case
involving the destruction of an orchard, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals allowed damages in terms of the value of- the trees apart from
the land and announced its broad policy in this area.
The owner of an estate is entitled to have his estate in such condition
as he wants it, and to keep upon it such things as he pleases. An
aviarv, a skating rink, a dancing pavillion, or the like, might m the
judgment of the average person add very little to the value of an
estate of land and yet these things might represent a considerable
investment of money. An orchard cannot be grown in a day. Yet
there are not a few persons who would think that the land without
the fruit trees would be worth more than with them. Still the person
who wants an orchard, and has invested his money in it, cannot be
depnved of his propertv by the act of a wrongdoer, and left without
remedy for loss sustained, simply because his land for other purposes
or to other people might be worth as much without the orchard as
with it.36
Measures of damages differ where trees grown for timber are
injured or destroyed. If destroyed, the recovery may be either the
market value of the timber separated from the land or the difference
in the value of the land before and after the timber is removed.37
The diminished value of the land as a measure is particularlv
applicable for destruction of small, immature trees which have no
present value except as related to the land.38
3', Samson Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 218 Md. 458, 147 A.2d 430 (1958).
(1958).
36 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Beeler, 126 Ky. 328, 335, 103 S.W 300, 302 (1907).
37 McConmck, Damages §126 (1935).
38 Kentucky Stave Co. v. Page, 125 S.W 170 (Ky. 1910).
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For conversion of mature timber the measure of recovery is
dependent upon the innocent or willful nature of the taking. Where
the taking is innocent the measure is the value of the standing timber,
z.e., stumpage value.3 9 However, some courts permit recovery of the
value of the timber after cutting.40 Where the taking is willful the
measure is the manufactured value, without deduction for the cost of
cutting, hauling and processing.
41
In Kentucky, punitive damages and statutory restraints apply for
violations of timber rights. Felonious cutting of timber worth over
twenty dollars can subject a violator without color of title to a one
year prison sentence; 42 for cutting timber worth less than twenty
dollars the penalty may be a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars nor less than fifty dollars or confinement in prison up to six
months or both.43 Punitive damages for willful cutting are recogmzed
by statute.44
The measure of damages for removal of minerals is determined by
the innocent or willful nature of the taking. For innocent trespass
and removal, the measure in Kentucky is the value of gross receipts
less cost of production. 45 For willful trespass and removal the measure
is the aggregate of the gross receipts with interest, without deduction
of cost of production.4
The measure to be applied is critical where the mineral potential
has increased the property value substantially and where, for example,
a willful trespasser sinks a well or digs a mine only to discover a dry
hole or coal of little or no value. Immediately, the land value
decreases. Under the Kentucky rule, little more than nominal dam-
ages would be recovered. Under the rule of diminution in value,
substantial damages would be recovered. The problem was presented
in a Texas case where the plaintiff owned the land and a three-fourths
interest in the mineral rights.47 Oil had been discovered on adjoining
property The defendant, whose three year lease had lapsed, drilled
a dry hole on the plaintiff's property The value of the mineral right
39 Allen v. Ferguson, 253 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1952).
40 United States v. McCasldll, 200 Fed. 332 (N.D. Fla. 1917).
41 United States v. Flint Lumber Co., 87 Ark. 80 112 SW 217 (1908);
Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga. 123, 152 S.E. 222 (1930) (dictum); Frampton & Co.
v. Saulsberry, 268 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1954) (dictum).4 2 Ky. Rev. Stat. 433.260 (1).
43 Ky. Rev. Stat. 433.260 (2).
44 Ky. Rev. Stat. 364.130 (1).
4. Delta Drilling Co. v. Arnett, 186 F 2d 481 (6th Cir. 1950) (dictum).
46 Ibnd.
47 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W 190 (Tex. 1925).
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before the drilling was $1,000 per acre and worthless afterward.
The plaintiff recovered $1,000 per acre, the diminution m the value of
the land. A contrary result was reached in a Wyoming decision where
only nominal damages were recovered.
48
The Kentucky rule, based on gross receipts, is proper where
substantial removal of minerals has resulted. However, a technical
trespass revealing an absence of minerals would place the full loss
on the holder of the mineral rights. If the holder intended to develop
the mineral, placing the loss on hin would be proper. However, in
most instances, the holder intends to sell the rights, transferring the
risk to the purchaser. The use of nominal damages coupled with
punitive damages is a solution.
ERsoNAL INjUIEms ERom HAms To RELTY
The Restatement of Torts provides that "a trespasser on land is
subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the possessor thereof or
to-members of his household by any act done, activity carried on or
condition created by the trespasser while upon the land irrespective
of whether the trespassers conduct is such as would subject him to
liability were he not a trespasser."49 Pennsylvania applied this rule
to a case in which the defendant dug a hole on the plaintiffs land
without his permission. The court held that personal injuries proxi-
mately resulting from the plaintiffs fall into the hole were com-
pensable.8 0
Discomfort and annoyance also may be compensable personal
injuries resulting from harms to realty In a California case, an
action in trespass was brought against the owner of a cotton gin for
injuries to person and property from vapors, lint and waste material
from the gin.5i Recovery included restoration cost or the diminished
market value, whichever was lower, plus such sum as would reasonably
compensate the adjommg owners for discomfort and annoyance
resulting from the cotton gin. To prevent "double recovery," Kentucky
denies separate recovery for annoyance and discomfort.8 2 But ,in
proving the diminished market value, it is proper to show discomfort
and annoyance for assessment by the jury5 3
In an Alabama decision, damages were upheld for mental suf-
48 Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927); Comment, 36
Yale L.J. 1167 (1927); Comment, 11 Corn. L.Q. 416 (1926).
49 Restatement, Torts §380 (1934).50 Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232 (1952).
L Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955).
2-Ash v. Kentucky Util. Co., 267 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1954).
53 Kentucky-West Virguna Gas Co. v. Lafferty, 174 F.2d 848 (1949).
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fermg resulting from the willful cutting of two of the plaintiffs oak
trees.5 4 The court stated that "when trespass is committed under
circumstances of insult or contumely, mental suffering may be com-
pensated for, when it a proximate result."55 This stretches the concept
of recoverv for harms to realty; few cases have gone this far. Kentucky
has refused recovery for mental suffering where a defendant's dogs
committed trespass against the plaintiff's land, crops and sheepP
OTH-ER_ CONSEEATIONS
Interests. costs resulting from lost of time, and the expenses
reasonably necessary to avert further harm are normally recoverable.
57
However, unless a tort is intentional or reckless, the plaintiff may not
recover if the consequences could have been avoided by the injured
party in the exercise of due care.58 Simply stated, the injured party
may not idly watch the injury occur and expect compensation if he
could have prevented the injury
When a plaintiff receives a benefit through a torifeasors conduct,
the value of the benefit may be considered in mitigation of damages
if it is a benefit peculiar to the interest harmed.59 The rule does not
apply where the benefit goes to the public in general with incidental
special harm to a particular interest, e.g., where a factory benefits the
whole community by increasing rent and value of adjoining property,
the benefit is not a proper one for mitigation if the factory causes a
particular plaintiff's house to shake causing injury to it. In a California
case defendant's oil well blew four to seven inches of oil, mud and
rock upon the plaintiff's property Defendant contended that the
property had actually been benefited by the discovery of oil.60 The
court properly rejected this contention and stated the test to be the
cost of repairing the injury by removing the debris or the diminution
in the market value if restoration would exceed that value. This is the
better nile. No person should be required to have his property
benefited without his consent, particularly where it limits the present
use of the land.
Howard Dotvnng
54 Dawsey v. Newton, 244 Ala. 661, 15 So. 2d 271 (1943).
55 15 So. 2d at 273.
5,6 Stephens v. Schadler. 182 Kv 833, 207 S.W 704 (1919).
57 See Restatement, Torts §§913, 914, 919 (1939).
"s Id. §918.
.9 id. §920.
1'0 Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928); see
Carpenter. Thc Doctinne of Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 5 So. Cal. L. Rev.
263 (1932).
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